Terrorism Typology for Consequence Managers: Identified, Explained, and Redesigned

    Rarely can terrorism’s definition and categories fit into one package suitable to all law enforcement agents, investigators, consequence managers (CM), and academics.  This paper makes no pretense to be an exception.  Rather, by narrowing this paper’s scope to functionality of CM, I propose this thesis.  Consequence managers need to understand past terrorist global patterns to discover future trends for the purpose of aligning the right policies and strategies within prevention measures.  My paper uncovers evidence supporting this thesis within a two-fold layout.  First, this paper describes and interprets variations in terrorism definitions.  Second, this paper discusses three terrorism typologies based on world system structural location of sub-state groups and state targets. The standing research question is what do these typologies mean to a consequence manager? Throughout this paper, the definition of CM pertains to various agencies within the United States government responsible for sharing “the common theme that consequence management constitutes actions taken in the aftermath of a disaster,” (Taylor, Rowe, and Lewis, 1999, p. 79).  These agencies ranging from Federal Emergency Management Agency to Department of Defense each define CM slight differently depending on their organization’s mission and types of disaster they respond to, yet the concern for such differences is overshadowed by similar scope and intent in each agency’s responsibility to identify and manage risk, and ultimately handle the after effects of crises.  For this paper, I want to narrow the scope of CM to regarding terrorist acts resulting from nuclear, biological, and chemical attacks, as well as the standard violent conventional assaults including bombings and assassinations.  Consequence managers are entrusted by civilians to protect their livelihood from all terrorist acts.  They perform along a sharp edge, guided by Constitutional principles in managing terrorism’s diversity, to balance security and individual freedom when defending against all threats, foreign or domestic.  Therefore, CMs will be judged by how well they accomplish this noble duty without crossing the line and the number of terrorists they prevent.

    The primary resource for this paper is Bergesen and Lizardo (2003).  Their work formulates a categorical methodology for identifying terrorism events by ideology and location.  At the conclusion of this report, I extrapolate from these categories a means by which CMs can diagram and [1]predict future Type 1, 2, and 3 terrorist events.

    In similarity to consequence management, terrorism is not a singularly definable action conducted by single-minded adversary.  Terrorism cannot be boxed in as some specific action every time violence is perpetrated against civilians.  In fact its nature changes, like a virus’ genetic code that officials cannot tamp down.  Between 1992 and 2001, the number of worldwide terrorist incidences decreased, while the rate of lethality per event increased (Hoffman, 1998; Hoffman, 1999; Global Terrorism Database, accessed June 23, 2009).  September 11, 2001 acted as culmination point to this lethal incident rate proportionality.  Since then, copious terrorism research data portends a disturbing trend showing the number of terrorist acts is increasing, albeit without the same number of fatalities (Global Terrorism Database, access June 23, 2009).  In 2001, there were approximately 1100 global terrorist incidents compared to 5200 in 1991.  In the six years following September 11^th, the number of incidences increased to about 2100.  As consequence managers lay the foundation for their prevention measures, these statistics can be a reliable asset to devising the course of actions they seek.  In as much most CMs are affiliated with government agencies, their asset base is tied closely to the going taxable revenues from the civilians they are upheld to protect.  The importance of finding these patterns and tracing them to preventative strategies against future acts is necessary to allocating available resources without having to continually seek more and more funds.  Again, it is a veritable mantra to reiterate that CMs must balance security and individual freedom.  By stripping away personal economic rights to wealth for the good of security, would be just as damaging to the populace’s collective psyche if CMs had ten percent of it falsely arrested for looking like terrorists. 

    Homeland Security’s relative specialty fields of study, including consequence management, are contributed to by numerous authors who offer their own distinctive definitions of terrorism by explaining its generally associated philosophy, psychology, and nature that approves violence as a means to an end.  For Bergesen and Lizardo (2003), whose work foundationally constructs terrorism’s typologies, they look toward the insightful defining contributions by Cooper (2001) and Ruby (2002).  Cooper’s (2001) categorical approach to terrorism is more artistic than scientific.  He confronts the issue head-on when writes, “It can be stated with absolute certainty that there has never been, since the topic began to command serious attention, some golden age in which terrorism was easy to define or, for that matter to comprehend,” (p. 881, 2001).  With this milieu surrounding the problem of harnessing one common definition, terrorism is best categorized as an “intentional generation of massive fear by human beings for the purpose of securing or maintaining control over other human beings,” (p. 883).  Cooper’s confidently asserts his definition is useful to gleaning practical expectations for understanding terrorism as this field of study transits from the 20^th to the 21^st century.  As innocent and artistic Cooper appears to be in hopes of securing a standalone, simplified doctrinally-based definition, it is inadequate to address the nature of terrorist behavior.  His description opens doors to misuse by historical revisionists who aim to rewrite human relationships.  A revisionist might utilize this definition to relate how religious leaders proclaim obedience and fear of an invisible god as a path to salvation to retooling an atmosphere of control over human thoughts and behavior by the hands of the leaders for their own selfish greed and power.  A revisionist might go so far as to maneuver Cooper’s definition against long standing national governments altruistic needs to tighten laws and regulatory security in the name of protecting its citizens from some crisis, which generates massive fear in the populations.  Cooper’s definition may fit an academic exercise to define terrorism, but it is inadequate for comprehending dangers in the real world.  National leaders must identify genuine terrorist acts and define their origins specifically to counteract them through diplomatic, political, economic, and military means.

    The second author defining terrorism is forensic psychologist Ruby (2002).  His focus is the legal source definition set by United States Code Title 22, which outlines terrorism as a premeditated, politically motivated violence committed against noncombatants by sub-national or clandestine agents (2007).  Ruby recognizes a tripartite relationship between political motivation, noncombatants, and sub-national or clandestine agents as the formative basis for outlining a state’s view of terrorism.  In supporting this definition, Ruby adds, “There will, however, be some areas of gray where terrorist and non-terrorist acts according to this definition will seem to be very similar, especially as they affect people psychologically,” (p.13, 2002).  He is correct to draw these subtle distinctions because the very nature of U.S. Special Forces is to clandestinely attack targeted individuals, who might very well be a non-combatant at the time. Would governments classify other nations’ special military forces as terrorists because their actions intend to carry out premeditated violence?  The answer is an emphatic no.  There is no justification for executing terrorism in the name of a Special Forces mission in a Western worldview.  The intent of defining terrorism appropriately is not relegated to meeting some politically correct version to suit a temporary need.  Rather, the intent, and Ruby’s article appears to support this contention, is to provide a meaningful baseline by which a state can follow a course of action when acts of terrorism are perpetrated against its interests.  Cooper and Ruby’s definitions are examples that represent a significant contribution to the diversity of viewpoints in understanding terrorism.  As described above, the role of a CM is to muster defensive strengths within certain limitations that justifiable balance the diversity of terrorism’s constructs without harming individual liberties when defending against terrorist threats as categorized in the next section.

    The following section answers the question proposed during the introduction asking what do terrorism typologies mean to a consequence manager.  Bergesen and Lizardo (2003) offer three typologies of terrorism relationships betweens offenders and victims.  They begin their argument by framing a baseline, albeit diverse, definition of terrorism as analyzed in the previous section.  They call these categories Type 1, Type 2, and Type 3.  The backdrop for this discussion on terrorism spans the eras since the late 19^th century when scholars commonly accept modern terrorism began (Rapoport, 2001).

    Type 1 refers to terrorism in the core.  Generally, the core is any state with a stable, organized national government that participates in world affairs on a routine basis.  One can interpret leading states in the United Nations including U.S. Russia, <?xml:namespace prefix = st1 ns = "urn:schemas-microsoft-com:office:smarttags" />China, France, Germany, and England as core representation.  Calling the West as solely the core is not accurate; yet, Type 1 history reveals many instances of terrorism against such powers.  In these core states exist or at one time existed terrorist bands such as the German Red Brigade, Irish Republican Army (IRA), and Basque Separatists (ETA) and Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC).  Their philosophies and political exhortations range from left to right with particular ideological or ethnic grievances against their core state governments.   Their goals are to overturn core central governments or carve out particular regions of filial identification from existing national boundaries.  They are active through several decades until their resources diminish, popular support wanes, membership dramatically decreases, or legitimate government forces disband them.  Type 1 terrorist groups face an overwhelming challenge for achieving their aims because they fight against firmly entrenched regimes with much greater resource pools and professional, sustainable militaries, as well as largely unsympathetic populations.  From an historical spotlight, anti-core terrorist groups can only achieve their aims when a population super majority turns against the government for reasons not wholly concentric to the terrorists, but in part because of some monumental shift in values and ideas as characterized by the 1917 Russian Revolution (Trotsky, 1920).  In that example, anarchists-nihilists had for decades tried to overthrow the tsarist dictatorship.  What they failed to do was accomplished for similar, but not equal reasons by the Marxist Lenin, who utilized the convergence of world war and mass social unrest to his advantage in wresting control from the core leadership.  Type one terrorism groups harvest little sympathy in current stable core state consequence managers.  Therefore, core governments must institute firm, fully resourced polices to diminish the threats or completely root out the groups as England did with the IRA and U.S. did with domestic militia groups since 1970s (Kaplan and Tharp, 1998).  Consequence managers must decide upon a course of action suited to counteract these groups so as to minimize endangering civilians while providing rational security and core stability. 

    The second category outlined by Bergesen and Lizardo represents the preponderance of world terrorist events.  These events consist of terrorist groups fighting against oppression operating in and against the local government semi-peripheral or peripheral confines of loosely bound or weakened nation-states created after de-colonization.  The African continent possesses many such states as a result of the 1960s and 1970s mass independence campaigns against colonial administrators.  Other countries include Iraq, Jordan, Syria and Turkey.  The common thread between these countries is historical border realignment.  As colonial powers withdrew, they arbitrarily created some international borders that have pitted age-long enemies to square off against each other on the same piece of land (Bergensen and Lizardo, 2003; Hoffman, 1998; Washburn).  As a result of the restructuring of new nation-states, ethnocentrism multiplied; with that, ethno-separatist terrorists from Israel to Rwanda to Sri Lanka grew in power, size, and influence until the rival group fought back or the central government reasserted control.  These terrorist bands strike at the peripheral / semi-peripheral elements of countries by attacking local governments.  As with the Indonesian Jemaah Islamiyah, these attacks intend to undermine all sub-core organized government authority and impress fear on local populations to bend their will (Kingsbury, 2008).  U.S. domestic CM must learn from these examples in order to destabilize such type 2 groups from gaining footholds in local populations and gathering strength from thereof.  These lessons are:  one, the core government must apply consistent pressure in force to overwhelm perceived terrorist provocateur threats within in the periphery; two, the core government must not underestimate passive-defense measures such as deradicalization, which influences low ranking terrorist members to turn against the groups and ultimately sweeps out personnel support for the more dangerous terrorist leaders to grow their organization.  The U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the domestic consequence manager for Type 2 terrorism since it is oriented towards internal law enforcement.  As their year by year terrorism reports indicate, the FBI are applying these lessons to diminish the threats from radical domestic U.S. terror organizations, whether they be externally influenced by Al Qaeda or solely internal such as the Animal Liberation Front (National Counterterrorism Center, 2008; FBI, 1999) .  Type 2 terrorism positions a country to endure decade-long or more periods of conflict.  By managing these groups squarely from the outset of their endangering tactics, domestic CMs can halt their advancement into the forays of many generations.  Henceforth, centralized resource allocation through federal outlays requires strict attention to details when defining strategies that engage type 2 domestic groups in order to insist upon the best self-defense mechanisms possible.

    Type 3 terrorism is the last category in focus.  This category outlines transnational terrorism which the Bergesen and Lizardo define as “projected from one area of world system core / periphery structural divisions of labor unto another,” (p. 172).  While this characterization may seem more complicated than the previous two, type 3 simply means the adversary, which operates in local areas from provinces to towns in one country directly attacks against core targets in another country for the purpose of addressing a perceived oppression.  The earliest Type 3 terrorists were Russia’s 19^th and 20^th century anarchists.  Their influence spread throughout Europe and the United States.  The matchstick to World War 1 in 1914 was struck at the hands of an anarchist and U.S. President McKinley was assassinated by a self-proclaimed anarchist. Al Qaeda’s attack on September 11, 2001 is a classic example of transnational terrorism.  The adversaries carried out their aggression from caves in Afghanistan.  They even planned their murderous schemes from apartments in Europe.  Al Qaeda represents a more advanced type 3 adversary in that, unlike the anarchists, which by nature, do not appreciate authority and single band leaders following a single scripted goal, today’s groups organize on an ad hoc basis, with homogeneity and organize to work together to engage in a specific operation (Bowman, 2000).  This characterization is not a means to apply a cookie cutter model to Al Qaeda, and current trans-nationalists, but this and other groups have learned to utilize modern technology to synchronize agendas against specific targets for common goals.  Bergesen and Lizardo (2003) attribute their synchronicity to frustration of radical domestic (type 2) failures in achieving aims. 

    Planning factors included by CMs when devising strategies to protect the country and its citizens from Type 3 terrorism should account for where type 3 groups populate various sectors of the world.  The likelihood of pinpointing one element to subvert any potential attacks requires significant investments in resources, global cooperation, and patience.  Considering transnational terrorist adversaries a pieces in a massive jigsaw puzzle helps understand that finding one individual does not assure a consequence manager that he can find the next individual.  Furthermore, a CM’s functional performance is determined by how strong the relationship is that exists between countering transnational terrorism and the affected civilian population.  The strength of defense is proportionate to the amount of leadership sown by affected core leaders’ willingness to continue pursuit, the number of assets it brings into the fight, and the weariness or care factor of the populations themselves.  Americans continue to demonstrate majority support for the U.S. actions against type 3 terrorism.  Rasmussen (2009) reports 61% over 25% of U.S. voters agree with President Obama’s decision to put more U.S. troops in Afghanistan.  The positive gains in trust for the administration’s CM is a direction favorable towards inevitably defeating the transnational threats, or in the very least, holding them off from attacking domestic targets. 

    This paper explored the evidence supporting what consequence managers need to know to understand past terrorist global patterns to discover future trends for the purpose of aligning the right policies and strategies within prevention measures.  First, I described and interpreted diversity in terrorism definitions.  Second, I discussed three new typologies of terrorist activity while answering what those categories mean to consequence managers.  My conclusion finds more depth can be added to study of terrorism trends by diagrammatically overlaying Bergesen and Lizardo’s categories onto Rapoport’s (2001) waves of terrorism.  Rapoport cites wave one as anarchists, wave two as independence seekers, wave three as internationalists, and wave four as religious zealots. 

In this diagram, I demonstrate when and where the preponderance of various terrorism types occurred.  My overlay shows the underlying terrorist activity has been type one.  With the fourth wave, Type 1 has altogether disappeared and I recognize an emerging transnational threat for an undetermined length of time.  With this model I expect to help CMs create a device for recognizing possible patterns and when certain types of terrorism have occurred in modern times.  Furthermore, I offer it up as means to form predictive inferences for what future waves of terrorism might look like.  Perhaps a 4^th type or 5^th wave of terrorism has yet to be discovered. Perhaps consequence managers might be looking at cyber terrorism as the new wave.  The possibility of a new wave altogether or a hybrid maturation of type 3 typology is a genuine threat against the current CM defenses designed for religious terrorism.  Consequence managers may ask how my diagram can better serve their strategy-making.  They can look towards the goals of the National Counterterrorism Center whose own leaders admit to seeking transparency by establishing partnerships with academics and professionals to build a better repository and cataloging system of the U.S. government’s database on terror attacks known as the Worldwide Incidents Tracking System (NCTC, 2008, p. 3).  Other collective organizations are conducting major efforts to track past events to understand future trends through RAND Corporations and the Oklahoma City National Memorial Institute for the Prevention of Terrorism  (MIPT) in their database recording 27,000 incidences (Guo, Liao, and Morgan, 2007).  Yet, CMs need to visualize patterns to firmly grasp the next metamorphosis in terrorism strategy.  Guo et al. acknowledge,

It is a challenging task to explore and understand the patterns and trends in this [MIPT] dataset.  Very often we are forced to examine patterns along one dimension at a time.  For example, the data may be examined chronologically to determine the rate of change. The data may also be organized geographically by generating country-level choropleth or density maps. . . The data may also be summarized by target types to understand the characteristics of incidents. There are two major challenges to visualize such a complex dataset. First, it is difficult to visualize the data across several dimensions (including geography, time, and multiple attributes) and to present the patterns in an easy-to-understand form . . . Second, to gain a comprehensive understanding of the data, we often need to visualize the data from different perspectives and search for different types of patterns. (p. 767).

My diagram interprets the waves of terrorisms patterned by the known categories to present multi-faceted terrorist trends in a visually simplified format to diametrically account for time and geography.  It is the role of the CM to better understand these patterns, with the assistance of raw data from the multiple public databases, to seek out minute, subtle instances of changing tactics that points towards the evolution of a new wave or category, and then create the defense strategy to oppose it before it gains a foothold in this generation of counterterrorism.  Once again, consequence managers find themselves at a crossroads where new technology brings together a summation of terrorist events with a necessity for understanding what the next terrorism typology will be shaped as.  This paper presents a waypoint tool to that task.

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